Consumer

Could social media platforms be treated as ‘products’ under the Consumer Protection Act 1987? If so, they could face strict liability for harms caused by addictive design features and algorithmic manipulation, says Harry Lambert of Outer Temple Chambers, writing in NLJ this week

In the second part of this series, Harry Lambert tackles some key questions: is social media a ‘product’ at all, and how might claims be brought against its platforms?

The rules and regulations on debanking (where a bank terminates its relationship with a customer) are due to change next year. In this week’s NLJ, David Hamilton, partner at Howard Kennedy, sets out the likely changes and explores the implications for payment services firms

David Hamilton on how the UK’s new debanking rules reshape financial services risk management

Ceri Morgan analyses the response to lender liability in motor finance broker commission cases

FirstRand, a hotly-anticipated Supreme Court judgment likely to arrive in July, could have far-reaching implications for the motor finance and wider financial services industries. In this week’s NLJ, Ceri Morgan, membership secretary of the London Solicitors Litigation Association, and knowledge counsel at Herbert Smith Freehills, explores the fiduciary duties involved, the key questions that will need to be answered by the Supreme Court, and the impact on the motor finance market

In the first part of a new series, Harry Lambert puts social media firms under the spotlight, asking: to what extent are they liable for harm?

Like the elephant in the famous parable, trade mark dilution isn’t easily determined, writes Mark Engelman

How close is too close? Intellectual property barrister Professor Mark Engelman, 4-5 Gray’s Inn, considers the concept of trade mark dilution, in this week’s NLJ.

The Johnson v FirstRand Bank case on ‘secret’ commissions for motor finance is causing quite a stir, but should it have been brought at all? In this week’s NLJ, Fred Philpott, Gough Square Chambers, writes: ‘The whole premise of the case is false; there were no real “commissions”, let alone fiduciary relationships.’