David Burrows addresses the issue of set aside orders
The subject of altering an existing court order, crossed explicitly with non-disclosure, fraud and other forms of matrimonial dishonesty, has been much in the family law news; as have setting aside orders, most recently in JP v NP [2014] EWHC 1101 (Fam), Eleanor King J where the controversial “ McCartney order” (see McCartney v Mills McCartney [2008] EWHC 401 (Fam), [2008] All ER (D) 269 (Mar)) was sanctioned). The lawyer who gives advice in this area will find an array of legal and procedural principle—none of which is assisted by the inscrutable s 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (in operation in the new Family Court as of 22 April).
Section 31F(6) says that “any order” made by the family court can be varied, rescinded, suspended or revived. On this basis, centuries of jurisprudence, based on the principle that there must be an end to litigation, would be irrelevant in the family court (but not, perhaps, in the separate
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