Bosseigh v Bosseigh

I heard this application over several days. Although the amounts involved are minuscule, I thought it right to hear every conceivable piece of evidence and every possible argument, as I am very conscious that an appeal will risk my
reputation.

length of marriage

The applicant wife (whom I shall refer to as the applicant wife), told me that she had been married to the respondent husband (the respondent husband) for many years. The number of years was hotly disputed by the respondent husband and we spent many hours dealing with this issue, until Miss Knowitorl sensibly suggested that we look at the marriage certificate, which resolved the matter. Both parties were wrong.

approximate progeny

We then had to consider the issue of issue, ie the children of the marriage. On this point I preferred the evidence of the applicant wife, who stated on oath that she had given birth to not less than three children and not more than five. I found the evidence of the respondent husband on this point less than satisfactory.

The ages of the parties were a contentious issue. Certainly I came to the conclusion that the applicant wife was a lot older than was argued on her behalf. I found it a lot more difficult to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the age of the respondent husband. His hair was quite clearly dyed, and I am not convinced it was entirely his own; but he was not what I believe is termed obese and although I normally deprecate the wearing of jeans in my court, at least he had the decency to wear a different pair each day.

obfuscated occupations

Neither party could make any admission about the employment of the other. The applicant wife thought the respondent husband to be either an accountant or a jockey; the respondent husband was convinced that the applicant wife was a pole dancer, or possibly an investment consultant. Suffice to say, I could not accept the evidence of either, and find that the applicant wife is an optician’s receptionist and the respondent husband a landscape gardening consultant.

I was invited to hear argument on the identity of the parties’ respective solicitors, but I came to the conclusion that resolving this issue would not greatly assist my deliberations.

intriguing accusations

Throughout the entire hearing the parties could be heard making what I can only describe as sotto voce snide remarks to and about each other. Each appeared anxious to have the last word to and about the other, and it was abundantly clear that neither had the slightest intention of listening to the other. It was also clear that they were appropriately named. I could not help overhearing a steady stream of allegations which each made about the other’s conduct. Their respective counsel were equally anxious that these allegations should be put in evidence, and I have no doubt they would have been extremely interesting to hear, but as I was due to go on a well-deserved holiday at the end of the case regrettably I was unable to allow that evidence to be given.

worldly goods

I had always understood that details of the parties’ assets would be of assistance to the court in resolving disputes of this nature, but both counsel persuaded me that such information would not advance either party’s case and I therefore heard no evidence about this. However, both counsel helpfully set out what they believed the parties might have earned; but there was no common ground here and I will probably have to make findings.
Turning to the law, s 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was mentioned by Miss Knowitorl, closely followed by Mr Flatterer, which I found particularly helpful. Unfortunately, neither counsel was able to produce the text of this section, which put us at a disadvantage, as it is not a section that has previously been drawn to my attention.

possible precedents

Mr Flatterer also suggested that there may be some case law on the subject, but he had been unable to put his finger on it. Miss Knowitorl, however, living up to her unusual name, said that she had heard somewhere that treating the parties equally was a good starting point, but that in this case I should not do so, and argued that fairness demanded that the applicant wife should receive “not a bean”, as she so picturesquely put it. Mr Flatterer was not at all convinced by this argument, however, and urged me to award to the applicant wife every penny that the respondent husband had and more, in case more should turn up at some time in the future.

Doing the best I can, therefore, and taking into account all that should be taken into account, but disregarding all that is not relevant, and making findings on the balance of possibilities, and taking one consideration with another, I come to the inevitable conclusion that this couple should remain locked together for the rest of their days, be debarred from ever setting foot inside a court again, and that their lawyers should personally pay to each other all costs incurred, on an indemnity basis and without limit.

John Fortgang